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WHAT WE TOGETHER DO (Derek Parfit, 29 March 1988) 
INOTE: This draft is very rougb, especially towards tbe end.! 
I called a cbapter in a recent book 'Five Mistakes in Moral 
Matbematics '. One of tbese mistakes, I claimed, was to ignore tbe 
effects of wbat we togetber do. Tbere seemed to me several cases in 
which we should appeal to these effects. I now believe that tbe 
mistake was mine: we never need to appeal to tbese effects. In this 
paper I eIplain this cbange of view. 
The paper defends Act Consequentialism. But it can be read, 
more broadly, as a defence of one view about tbe pUI of morality 
whicb depends on consequences. 
I OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE RIGHTNESS 
We must first distinguisb two kinds of rightness. Call my act 
and 
slIbjectively rigbt if it is what I ougbt to do given what, at tbe 
time of acting, I have reason to believe, I 
I This use of 'subjective" bas nothing to do with the 
ob jectivity of ethics. Note that, on some definitions, what is 
subjectively right depends on what the agent HelllaUy believes. On 
my definition, it depends on what be ollShl to believe. If his 
beliefs are unreasonable, they cannot justify his acts. 
I 
objectively right if it would be what I ought to do if I knew all 
of the morally relevant facts . 
Suppose I have every reason to believe that my act will save your 
life. In fact, it kills you. My act is subjectively right, but objectively 
wrong. 
The notion of objective rigbtness bas, in a moral tbeory, obvious 
priority. It is this tbeory's ideal. But it has little practical 
importance. When we are deciding what to do, we sbould aim at 
subjective rightness. 
This may seem surprising. Should we not try to do what is 
objectively right? 
In some cases, this would make no difference. This is so if, 
when acting, we know all of the relevant facts. The two kinds of 
rightness then coincide. 
In other cases, this may not be so. Objective rigbtness depends 
on what is true. Subjective rightness depends on what we bave 
reason to believe. Tbese may differ. But we cannot aim at tbe trutb 
atiJer tiJlIO what we have reason to believe. We cannot in practice 
distinguish these. 
This may suggest that we should aim at botiJ kinds of rightness. 
We may think, The subjectively rigbt act is whatever is most likely 
to be objectively rigbt.· But this is too Simple. Suppose that several 
miners are trapped, with floodwaters rising. Before we can find out 
wbere these men are, we must decide which floodgate to close. The 
outcomes would be tbese: 
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The men are in 
Shaft A Shaft B 
Gate I We save ten All die 
We close Gate 2 All die We save ten 
We save nine We save nine I , Gate 3 
Assume that, on the evidence, the men are equally likely to be in 
either shaft. On this assumption, we ought to close Gate 3. But, 
though subjectively right, this act is certain to be objectively wrong. 
If we knew where the men were, we COUld, by acting differently, 
save an eItra life. 2 
Consider now Act Consequentialism, or AC 00 this theory, 
I • the objectively right act is whatever will in fact produce the 
best possible outcome. 
As the case just given shows. we should not always aim at objective 
rightness. We should not always try to do what is most likely to 
produce the best outcome, We should sometimes aim at a less good 
outcome, because it is easier to achieve, or the risk of bad effects is 
less. 
This. which is implicitly the common sense view, Act 
Consequentialism makes more precise. 00 this theory, 
2 Cf Regan, p.26S. 
3 
the subjectively right act is whatever will have the greatest 
I!Ipectl!d goodness. 
To calculate an ac!"s elpected goodness, we add together its possible 
good effects, and subtract its possible bad effects, with each effect 
being multiplied by the chance that the act will produce it. Thus, if 
an act has a one in two chance of saving twenty lives, and a one in 
five chance of losing five, the elpected goodness, in terms of lives 
saved, is 20/2---515, or 9. 
I have claimed that, when we are deciding what to do, we 
should ask what is subjectively right. In most conteIts, this is what 
'r ight' means. Similarly, when we are assigning blame, we should be 
concerned with subjective wrongness. Utilitarians have been 
criticized for claiming that, when Hitler 's parents had a child, their act 
was objectively wrong. If this claim seems absurd, this is because 
we take it in the sense which implies blame. It has no such 
implication. What it means is that, ff Hitler 's parents had known 
about the consequences of their act, it IVould havl! been wrong. Since 
they could not possibly have known, such claims are naturally ones 
that, in our ordinary moral thinking, we ignore. 
II COORDINATION PROBLEMS 
I NOTE: This section discusses a rather narrow question. It may be of 
interest only to those who have read Donald Regan 's book ~ 
{/liutui8J]ism 8J]dCooperatioll Others can jump to Section III.] (0"';\ f""J-€. 14- ) 
When our acts have combined effects, what each of us ought to do 
may depend upon what others do. If we cannot easily communicate, 
we then face coardiolitioD prolJ/e1118. Donald Regan has argued that, 
in such cases, Act Consequentialism is seriously flawed. 3 
Consider first I?qllD 's Cise. You and I each have two 
alternatives. The outcomes would be as shown below: 
You 
do A do B 
.--
do A Second-best Bad 
I 
doB Bad Best 
Regan's claims are these, An act is objectively right, according to AC, 
if produces the best possible outcome. Suppose that we both do B. 
Since we produce the best of these outcomes, each of us acts rightly 
aocording to AC. It may therefore seem that we have done what AC 
tells us to do. Surprisingly, this is not so. Suppose instead that we 
both do A. Though we produce a worse outcome, each again acts 
rightly according to AC. Each produces the outcome which is the best 
that is possible, given what the other does. Since you have done A, 
the outcome would have been even worse if I had done B. A similar 
claim applies to you. 
As Regan says, AC implies that we each act rightly if we 
eitlJer both do A or both do B. This is so despite the fact that, if we 
act in one of these two ways, we will thereby make the outcome 
3 OtilitllrillDiS111 JlJ1d Cooper3tioD, Oxford University Press, 
1982. 
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worse. Regan takes this to show that we should reject AC. It fails to 
have one virtue which he thinks essential to a Consequentialist 
theory. It is not true that if everyone slitis/Jes this theory---does 
what it tells them to do---they will be certain to produce the best 
possible outcome. 
Other forms of Consequentialism have this virtue. On one 
theory, each of us should do his part in the pattern of acts which, of 
all possible patterns, would make the outcome best. Oearly, if 
everyone satisfies this theory, this will produce the best possible 
outcome. But this theory lacks another essential virtue. It is not 
true that, if any single person satisfies this theory he will be certain 
to produce the best possible outcome. In Regan's Case this theory 
tells me to do B, since this is what it would be best for both of us to 
do. But, if I do B when you do A, I make the outcome worse than it 
could have been. As is often urged against the similar Kantian Test, 
or the thought 'What if everyone did that?', it can be disastrous to 
ignore what other people will in fact do. 
We need a theory, Regan claims, with the virtue that he calis 
;Jdapt;J/JjJjty. It must be true that, however many people satisfy this 
theory---whether only one, or some, or everyone---they will be 
certain to produce the best possible outcome. In the first half of his 
book, Regan shows that no traditional theory has this feature . In the 
second half, he presents a new theory, Cooperative Uli1ituiaJ1ist11, 
which is deSigned to do so. This theory is extremely complicated, 
and, as be admits, a partial failure . 4 
Regan·s project seems to me misguided. Wbat he objects to in 
AC may, I believe, be no fault. And, if it is, there is a simpler remedy. 
Act Consequentialists need not revise tbeir claim about objective 
rightness. It is enougb to extend this claim. 
4 It cannot wholly elplain how the agents manage to 
cooperate (Regan, pp, 161-2), 
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AC is usually applied only to single acts, or to each of several 
acts considered on its own. But it can also be applied to sets of acts, 
considered together. In Rellan's Case, when it is applied to sinille 
acts, AC says that we each act r i1!htly if we either both do A or both 
do B. It fails to say that we should ideally both do B, thereby 
producing the best possible outcome. But it could say this. An Act 
Consequentiallst could say that, if we both do A, thoullh each has 
done the best he can lIiven what the other does, we tOfiether have 
done worse than we could. He could say that we act ri1!htly only if 
'Ole both do B. 
I shall first elplain why AC need not be revised. As Rellan says, 
vhen we apply AC to single acts, it does not select the set vhich 
would produce the best outcome. But this is no objection. As far as 
sinille acts are concerned, AC claims just what it should. It claims 
. that each of us acts ri1!htly if he produces what, in the cir"umstaoces, 
is the best possible outcome. When I ask what I should do, what you 
do is put of the circumstances. That 's why, if you do A, I should do 
A too. No other act by me could, in these circumstances, make the 
outcome better. 
Suppose that I now eltend AC, so that it covers sets of acts. 
When I ask vhat we should do, what you do is 001 part of the 
circumstances. I can therefore add the claim that, if we both do A, 
we together act wrongly. ThoUllh neither by himself could have 
made the outcome better, we together could have done so. As 
Jackson says, we had an alternative that neither, by himself, had.5 
Does AC need to be eItended in this way? Only if, as Regan 
claims, a Consequentialist theory oUllht to be adaptable. Is this so? 
Why should it be true that, however many people satisfy this theory, 
they will be certain to produce the best possible outcome? 
5 Fran!< Jackson, 'Group Morality' lin a festschrift for j.J.e. 
Smart). lowe much to this paper. 
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We might say, 'Unless this is true, the acceptance of this theory 
may not have the best effects. But, on a Consequentialist theory, 
everything sbould be judged by its effects. If the acceptance of this 
theory does not have the best effects, it fails even in its own terms.' 
This reply, though natural. overlooks a point I earlier made. 
Regan's target is AC's claim about objective rightness; and this is not 
the claim which should guide our acts. If we accept AC, what we 
should try to foUow is AC's claim about subjective rightness. As we 
shaU see, this is untoucbed by Regan 's criticism. Regan's objection 
cannot be to the effects of accepting AC. But he may claim that, even 
if it works in practice, AC is theoreticaUy flawed. He may claim that, 
if a moral theory is not adaptable, it is intuitively unappealing. 
If this is so, my second point applies. In their account of 
objective rightness, Act Consequentialists need not turn to Regan's 
highiy complicated theory. It is enough to eItend AC so that it covers 
sets of acts. AC claims that each of us acts rightly if he produces the 
best outcome that he could produce. It can add that lVe act rightly if 
we produce the best outcome tbat we could produce. 
This suggestion differs from Regan's in the foUowing way. His 
Cooperative Consequentialism applies only to single acts, or to sets 
considered one by one. It takes the form, 'eacIJ has acted rightly if 
and only if .. .' Regan tries to find some formula which is such that, 
however many people satisfy this formula. they will be certain to 
produce the best outcome. This seems to me impossible. It also 
seems unnecessary. My suggestion substitutes, for tbe second balf of 
Regan's book, a single sentence. This can be simple because it is 
about wbat lVe should do. 
My suggested version of AC may seem incoherent. Suppose 
that, in Regan 's Case, we both do A. On my suggestion, though eacb 
of us acts rightly, we act wrongly. Tbis may seem impossible. How 
can truths about each not be true of us ? 
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With some truths, this i. not possible, Thus, if each is old, we 
cannot be young, Youth is a property of individuals: we tOflellJer 
cannot be young. But other properties are different. Even though 
each is weak, we together may be strong. 
My suggestion is of this second kind. If we both do A, each acts 
rightly because he makes the outcome as good as he can. We act 
wrongly because we together could have made the outcome better. 
As we have seen, these claims can both be true. 
Here is a similar objection. On my suggestion, though each acts 
rightly, we act wrongly. This may seem to imply that, though each is 
blameless, we deserve blame. And this may not seem possible. 
It is not. Blame attaches only to individuals. If each is 
blameless, we cannot deserve blame. But this is no objection to my 
claim. This is a claim about objective wrongness. As we saw in the 
case of Hitler 's parents, such a claim implies no blame. 
It may nelt be objected that, even if it is coherent, myeItended 
version of AC cannot, in practice, be applied. Should each of us try to 
act rightly, or should we try to do so? And, if the latter, how should 
we try? On my suggestion, we act rightly only if we produce the best 
possible outcome. This claim does not tell us how we are to achieve 
this result. 
It may nelt be said that, unlike me, Regan addresses this 
question. As he elplains, cooperation may be very hard to achieve. 
That is why his theory is so complicated. But since it is about what 
uc1J of us should do, it can at least be applied. My suggested version 
of AC, with its single claim about what we should do, may seem 
wholly to ignore these problems. It may seem to be simple only at 
the cost of being useless. 
This objection makes the same mistake. Since my claim is about 
objective rightness, it does not need to be applied. The practical 
question is always what we ought subjectively to do. We can now 
turn to this question. 
9 
In an account of subjective rightness, it is enough to apply AC to 
what each of us should do. There is no need for an eura claim about 
what Fe should do. Just as it is individuals, and not groups, who 
deserve blame, it is individuals, and not groups, who make decisions. 
(This is so even when these individuals act together as members of a 
group. When a group decides what to do, this is not a separate 
decision, over and above the decisions made by the members. We 
impute a decision to the group, according to certain rules or 
procedures, given the only actual decisions, which are those taken by 
the members. ·6 
Reconsider Regan 's Case. At the level of objective rightness, this 
case is puzzling. But this is entirely a theorist's problem. At the 
practical level, that of subjective rightness, the case presents no 
problem. 
Suppose that, as we know that we both know, we have the 
alternatives shown below, and we are both Act Consequentialists. 
You 
do A do B 
do A Second-best Bad 
I 
do B Bad Best 
6 I suggested that we eItend AC so that it covers sets of acts. 
On my definltion, Fe act objectively wrongly only if we fail to do 
what, if we knew aU of the relevant facts, Fe ought to do. This 
claim treats a group as a moral agent. If this makes no sense, even 
in a theory of objective rightness, we cannot eItend AC in this way. 
But, for the same reason, this ellension is not needed. It is no 
objection to AC that it fails to teU us what we should all ideally do. 
Either way, there is no surviving objection. 
10 
What doe. our theory tell u. to do? 
It is in some sense obvious that we should both do B. But AC 
doe. not directly tell us this. On this theory, it can be subjectively 
wrong to aim for the best outcome. 
The subjectively right act, according to AC, i. whatever will 
mnimize elpected goodness. To apply this claim to Regan·s Case, 
each of us must try to predict what the other will do. This is not 
difficult. Each of us ought to predict that the other will aim for the 
best outcome. Given that prediction, AC tells each to do the same. 7 
These remarks may arouse suspicion. I have admitted that AC 
does not directly tell us to aim for the best outcome. It tells us only 
to mnimize elpected goodness. Each must therefore try to predict 
what the other will do, and then do the same. But each knows the 
other to be an Act Consequentialist. Each can predict that the other 
will do what AC tells him to do. It may therefore seem that, for each 
to be able to predict that the other will aim for the best outcome, he 
must 3lre;uly know that this is what AC tells each to do. This 
reasoning may seem circular, or to beg the question. 
There need be no circularity. To see why, consider a different 
case. Suppose that you and I cannot communicate, and that the 
outcomes would be these: 
7 Note that we would solve this problem even if each thought the 
other was equally likely to act in either way. Even on this assumption, 
each ought to aim for the best outcome. A one-in-two chance of the best 
outcome has more elpected goodness than the same chance of the 
second-best. This problem is too easy. 
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You 
do A doB 
do A Equal-best Bad 
I 
doB Bad Equal-best 
I , 
Such cases may be, in practice, real coordination problems, It may be 
hard for each to predict what the other will do. 
Whether this is so depends on further details of the case. If A 
is an act like pushing a button, and B an act like not-pushing. there is 
no basis for a prediction. It will be mere luck if we end up doing the 
sam~ thing. But, as Schelling famously elplained, something very 
trivial and apparently irrelevant may be enough to solve such 
problems. Suppose that A is calling 'Heads', and B calling Tails '. 
Most of us would then call 'Heads', correctly predicting that the other 
would do the same. In Schelling 's word, calling 'Heads' is ·salient'. 
This act is salient even outside coordination problems. When 
tossing coins, 'Heads' is what most people call. But an act may be 
salient only because we know that we face a coordination problem. 
Suppose that, in some rescue mission, each has three alternatives. In 
terms of the numbers of lives saved, the outcomes would be these: 
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You 
do A do B doC 
do A 9 o o 
I do B o 10 o 
doC o o 10 
Wbat is salient bere is tbe sea?od-best outcome. More enetly, this 
will be salient if we know tbat we botb know that we face a 
coordination problem. Given tbese assumptions, the second best 
outcome is tbe obvious cboice. Since we know that we botb want to 
meet, this is the obvious place to go. It is tbe salient outcome, 
tbough inferior to others, because of tbe fact that, among tbe good 
outcomes, it is the one that is unique. 
Now return to Regan's Case. Here tbe unique best outcome is 
clearly salient. It is the obvious place to meet. 
Note nell tbat sucb reasoning need not require eitber moral 
thinking, or moral motivation. Egoists can just as easily solve these 
coordination problems. In such cases, their interests coincide: they 
will want to meet. If tbey know that they all know this, it can be just 
as obvious to them wbat tbe salient meeting-place is. Egoists can 
coordinate witbout accepting some cooperative moral tbeory. 
Tbe same is true of Act Consequentialists. Regan suggests at 
various points tbat defenders of AC are, in effect, converting to 
Cooperative Consequentialism. This may be true of some of tbe 
writers be discusses; but it is unnecessary. Like Egoists, Act 
Consequentialists would solve tbese problems witbout abandoning 
tbeir tbeory. 
They would not always solve tbese problems. If we apply AC, 
we are not certain to produce tbe best outcome. In some cases, tbe 
subjectively rigbt act may make tbe outcome worse. This may be so, 
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for eIample, if no act is salient, or if different acts seem salient to 
different people. 
There are other ways in which we might go astray. Thus in 
Regan's Case each of us might have reason to believe that the other 
will do A. Some credible joker may have told us this. AC would then 
teU us to do A, and we would fail to produce the best outcome. But 
for this failure it is not our theory but the joker who is to blame. 
In the cases where AC fails to lead us to the best outcome, we 
can describe other theories which would do better. Thus Rule 
Consequentialists might ignore what the joker said. Each might do 
what it would be best for both to do, even though he has reason to 
believe that, because the other will act differently, he will thereby 
make the outcome worse. But though we would sometimes gain if we 
ignored our beliefs about what others do, we would more often lose. 
In judging theories, we should ask how weU in general they would do. 
And the best general policy, in coordination problems, must be the 
one prescribed by AC. We will on the whole produce the best effects 
if we always do what, on the evidence, will have the best predictable 
effects. There is no other theory which, in coordination problems, 
would on the whole do better. 8 
III OVERDETERMINATION 
I turn now to the second kind of case where my book appealed to 
what we together do: cases of over determination. I failed to see how 
similar these cases were to those that I have just discussed. 
8 It may be worth adding to AC various hints about how to 
coordinate . It may even be worth suggesting what should be treated as 
salient in hard cases. But this would not be a move to a different theory. 
In these cases. t .... o or more people jointly cause some effect. 
This effect is overdetermined because. if anyone person had acted 
differently. this effect would still have occurred. In the example in 
my book. two men simultaneously shoot me. Either shot. by itself . 
.... ould have killed. 
This case is not ideal. since it would be hard to be sure that it 
involves overdetermination. This .... ould be more likely if there .... ere 
several agents. as in a Firing Squad. In some cases of this kind. the 
acts need not be simultanous. The effects may also come. not from 
acts. but from omissions. In aU these cases there are thresholds. or 
numbers of people acting. above or belo .... which different numbers 
would not alter the effect. Stock elamples are: failing to vote when 
not enough others vote. or walking on the grass when more than 
enough others walk. There are many actual cases of a more serious 
kind. 
These cases have the structure of Case (2) in the diagram below. (~) 
How do they compare with Regan's Case, which is Case (3)? 
Here is a way to describe both kinds of case. We can regard 
each agent as on a moral contour-map, .... ith better outcomes being 
higher ground. An agent is acting wrongly, according to AC. if he is 
on a slope: if. that is. by acting differently, he could have reached 
higher ground. The problem in Cases of type (2) is that. when the 
agents both do A, they are in a HilI V;zjjey. If either alone had acted 
differently, this would have made no difference. Neither on his own 
could have reached higher ground. The problem in Regan's Case is 
that, when the agents both do A. they are on a Lower Pelli:. Since 
they are on this peak. the outcome would have been worse if either 
alone acted differently. But in both cases, if we consider both agents 
(i J (tt5~ w(wt (O-ctr,l.u"..,u;'" 
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together, they are on slopes. They together could have reached 
higher ground. 9 
The other cases on this diagram complete, I believe, the 
interesting possibilities. lOWe are concerned with cases where we 
have failed to reach the summit. In these cases, if we had acted 
differently, we would have made the outcome better. It must be true 
of each person that, if he alone had acted differently, this would have 
either (a) also made the outcome better, or (b) left it the same, or (c) 
made it worse. Each person is on either a slope, or a nat vaUey, or a 
lower peak. In cases of kind (I ), cone-shaped mountains or MI Flljis. 
tbere is no coordination problem, since each individual's route to the 
summit goes uphill aU the way. In such cases, we do worse than we 
could only if eacb does worse tban he COUld. Cases of types (2) and 
(3) I have just discussed. (4) is tbe remaining case. This is like (3) 
eIcept tbat, if we both do A, we are on one of two twin peaks. 
It was' a mistake, in my book, to contrast cases of types (2) 
and (3), caJJing (2) cases of overdetermination, and (3) coordination 
problems. Suppose tbat, in both cases, we both do A. It is tben 
overdetermined, in bollJ cases, tbat we don't produce tbe best 
outcome. This is overdetermined because in neither case could either 
alone have acbieved tbis outcome by acting differently. Only we 
together could bave done so; by both acting differently. Similarly, for 
this same reason, botb cases are coordination problems. 
The difference between these cases can be re-eIpressed like 
this. Suppose tbat in each case each believes tbat the other will do A. 
Each knows that be can 't by himself achieve tbe best outcome. Still, 
in a Flat Valley, there's no harm in either person's at least trying to 
9 Note that, in such diagrams, the individuals must move 
like rooks, horizontaUy or verticaUy. Only we together can move 
diagonaUy like queens. 






reach this outcome, in the hope that the other person vill do the 
same, B is here the (/o111io.mt act, since it can't make the outcome 
vorse, and might make it better. But in Regan's Case neither act is 
dominant. There is harm in either person's trying, on his ovn, to 
reach the best outcome. If the other does not do the same, this will 
make things vorse. 
This is vhy it vas only Regan's Case that I called a coordination 
problem. Only here vill it be vorse if one of us, but not the other, 
aims for the best outcome. So only here does each need to know 
vbat the other vill do. But the difference betveen these cases may 
be slight. In vhat seem to be Flat Valleys, there vill often be some 
small cost if anyone eltra person aims for the best outcome. That 
converts these into Regan Cases. (Thus if voting involves some cost, 
and not enough people vote to secure tbe right result, each eltra 
voter makes the outcome slightly vorse. That makes this a Regan 
Case. But if ve ignore these eItra costs, it is a mere case of 
over determination. ) 
[FROM HERE ON MY DRAFT IS VERY ROUGH) 
Overdetermination raises a problem for theories about 
causation. Return to the men vbo simultaneously sboot me. If 
either bad not shot, I vould still have died. According to some 
.... riter., cau.e. mu.t be necessary for their alleged effect •. Since 
neither shot vas necessary, neither of these men caused my death. 
Other vriters claim tbat, if ve describe the effect more precisely, 
ve sball see tbat eacb sbot "'liS necessary. If eitber bad not sbot, I 
vould have died a slightly different deatb. 11 Otber vriters claim 
11 cr, Martin Bunzl. in the jovfl1l11 of PbiJosophy. 1979. 
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that causes need 1101 be necessary for their effects. It is enough if 
they are both operative and sufficient. 12 
We need not try to resolve this disagreement. It does not 
matter morally whether each man killed me. Killing is wrong only 
if it shortens the victim 's life. Neither man did this to me. 
The point can be put more generally. We should revise for 
moral purposes our ordinary use of words like 'harm ' and 'benefit. ' 
On that use. I may harm you even when my act is not worse for 
you. This will be so when my act. though sufficient to produce this 
harm. is not necessary. But in the morally relevant .ense my act 
must be necessary. It must be true that. if I had not acted. you 
would not have been harmed. I harm you. in this sense. only if my 
act is worse for you. 
In this sense. neither of my murderers harmed me. Neither's 
(, act was worse for me. So how can we explain why these men acted 
wrongly? 
12 As Hart and Honore write. in cases of this kind. 'the test of 
necessary condition must break down altogether. unless 
supple mented by that of generally sufficient conditions.' There are 
harder cases. One example i. /be Pul1ctured Poisol1ed Bollie. When 
X is about to cross the desert. Y poisons his waterbottle. Z then 
punctures the bottle. During his journey. X dies of thirst. Since it is 
thirst from Which X dies. it may seem that Z. the puncturer. is the 
murderer. Z does cause it to be true that X's dies of thirst. But this is 
not enough to show that Z kills X. If it did. whenever a doctor saves 
someone's life. he would thereby kill that person. since he would 
cause it to be true that this person dies at a different time. and in a 
different way. Suppose that Z's motive in puncturing the bottle was 
not to kill X. but to save him from the poison. Perhaps Z hoped that X 
would find an oasis before he died of thirst. If Z had this good 
motive. we would count him as trying to save X's life. We should not 
count the same act. with a bad motive. as a case of killing. 
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In my book I claimed that we should appeal to what they 
together did. They together harmed me. That is why they together 
acted wrongly, 
What I wrote suggested that, because they acted wrongly, 
e3cb acted wrongly. Since I was discussing objective wrongness, 
this was a mistake. I should have claimed that, in the objective 
sense, though they together acted wrongly, neither individually 
did.13 I should have then elplained that the objective sense is not 
the ordinary sense of 'wrong', or the sense which implies blame. It 
is a different question whether , in the ordinary or subjective sense, 
each acted wrongly, and should be blamed. And it is a further 
question how much punishment each deserves. 
On the questions of blame and desert, we can distinguish two 
views. On the CilvsiJ/ View, blame and desert depend in part on 
what the agent actually did, and on how much harm he caused. On 
the r/lnliJlO View, they depend only what he intended, and tried to 
do. 
Suppose two men attempt similar murders. Through good 
luck, one of them fails . On the Causal View, this man is less guilty. 
On the Kantian View, he is just as guilty, There are reasons for 
punishing attempted murder less than murder- --such as the need 
to deter second attempts---but these reasons do not appeal to a 
difference in desert. We can say, to the successful murderer, 
"Because you had bad luck, we 're going to punish you more.' But we 
should not say, 'Because you had bad luck, you deserve to be 
punished more ', 
As Nagel says, the li:antian View seems in theory compelling. 
How can desert depend on luck 7 But our reactive attitudes seem to 
reflect the Causal View. As I run upstairs because I left the baby in 
13 Cf Jackson again. {Add more about the relevance of 
counterfactual intentions.1 
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the bath, I may naturally think that I don't yet know how badly I 
have acted. I may think that, if the baby is all right, I have merely 
been negligent, while, if it has drowned, I have done a terrible 
thing. 
Unlike Nagel. I believe that we should here be true to our 
theoretical beliefs. If we accept the J::antian View, as I do, we 
should try to change our reactive attitudes. Perhaps we should not 
try to lose these entirely. But we should reject the moral 
judgments which they naturally produce, and by which they are 
reinforced. 14 
Reconsider the men wbo simultaneously shot me. Let us first 
assume that this was a coincidence. Each man intended to kill me, 
and neither knew that the other was about to shoot. The 
overdetermination played no part in the agents' motives. There 
are various actual cases where comparable claims are true. 
On the Causal View, to assess each man's gUilt, we must know 
whether he killed me. We must solve the causal puzzle mentioned 
above. On the J::antian View this is not necessary. Both men 
attempted murder. There would be no injustice if we Pllnished 
14 I've said that I accept the J::antian View about desert. This 
is perhaps misleading, since I reject desert. I accept the conditional 
view that, if there was desert, it could not depend on luck. This is 
partly why I believe that there is no such thing. Asl'lagel reminds 
us, whether an agent attempts murder may itself depend on luck, 
since it may be luck that the opportunity arose. And the agent's 
intentions, desires, and beliefs seem also, in the relevant sense, to 
depend on luck. In this sense, heredity is luck, so is environment, 
and so are any events which don 't depend on these. There is nothing 
left on which desert could possibly depend. This may seem a 
reductio of the Kantian View. How can this be the true view about 
the nature of desert if, when we think it through, it implies that there 
is no such thing? But this seems possible. On the true view about 
time travel. there could be no such thing. 
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each as much as a successful murderer. l~ This view can be 
combined with Act Consequentialism. According to AC, .ince each 
man had reason to believe that he would be harming me, he acted 
wrongly in the ordinary or subjective sense. 
Suppose nell that, when these men acted simultaneously, this 
was no coincidence. Each shot only because he believed that the 
other was about to shoot. Each knew that my death would be 
overdetermined. 
When agents know all of the relevant facts, objective and 
subjective wrongness coincide. So do the Kantian and Causal Views. 
If someone knows what he is doing, and how much harm he will in 
fact cause, there is no distinction between what he intends and 
what he actuaUy does. 
In this version of the case, neither man intends to kill me, in 
the sense of shortening my life. Since each knows that the other 
will shoot, each knows that his own act will not be worse for me. 
This suggests that, according to AC, neither acted wrongly. But why 
did they shoot 7 
Suppose there was prior coUusion. Each agreed that they 
would both shoot. At this earlier stage, there was no 
over deter mination. Since neither would have acted without the 
other. agreement, each knew that, in agreeing, he was making it 
likely that the other would shoot. Each then acted wrongly 
according to AC. 16 
1 ~ a. Hart and Honore: ·an act done with the intention of 
shortening life, which would normaUy be sufficient to kiU and 
which only fails because of the substitution of another cause of 
death, should be treated as murder.' 
16 And, as Hart and Honore remark, such coUusion would be 
sufficient for a charge of murder. 
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What if there was no oollusion? Though unlikely here, this is 
true in Firing Squads. And there are many other cases of this kind. 
Thus there are many cases where, in an overdetermined way, we 
together harm each other, or pollute or destroy our environment. 
In these cases there is some threshold, or nu mber of people acting, 
above which fur ther numbers do not increase the harm. Each of us 
may have reason to believe that, because this number will be 
passed, his own act will do no harm. Is each then acting wrongly 
according to AC? 
In some of these cases, the answer is Yes. As I remarked, if 
we all aim for the second-best outoome, we are in a Flat Valley. 
None by himself could have made the outoome better. But aiming 
for the better outoome is here the dominant choice. It cannot make 
the outoome worse, and, if enough others make the same choice, it 
will make it better. So, if there is the slightest chance that enough 
others will make this choice, this is what Act Consequentialists 
ought subjectively to do. 
Suppose there is no such chance. Suppose that in myexample, 
though there was no collusion, eacb man bad reason to be certain 
that tbe other would sboot. We must again ask wby tbey shot. 
There are various possibilities. They may have been obeying 
orders. Tbey may bave wanted to shield eacb otber from the 
responsibility of baving killed. Depending on tbe details of the case, 
acting witb tbese motives may deserve blame. In tbe cases of 
overdetermined pollution or destruction, our motives may be 
better. It may bere be true tbat, if any single person acted 
differently, be would make tbe outoome sligbtly worse. He migbt, 
for example, have to bear a pointless oost. As we have seen, this 
changes tbe example. It becomes, like Regan's Case, a coordination 
problem. 
IV DISPERSED EFFECTS 
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I turn now to a third kind case. In tbese cases, eacb of our acts 
eitber barms or benefits other people. But, because these effects 
are spread over so many people, the effect on eacb is either trivial 
or imperceptible. 
In mucb of our moral tbinking, we ignore such cases. We 
assume tbat, if an act bas effects on otbers tbat are eitber trivial or 
imperceptible, it cannot be wrong bea1use of these effect •. My 
book argued that this is a mistake. If an act has such effects on 
very many people, the smallness of each effect may be cancelled 
out by the size of the number affected. 17 
I gave two examples. One was the ]}rops of Water. Many 
wounded men lie out in the desert, suffering from intense thirst. 
We are as many potential belpers, each of whom has a pint of 
water. Each of us could pour his pint into a water-cart. This would 
be driven into the desert, where our water would be shared equally 
between the wounded men. By adding his pint to the cart, each of 
us would give each man slightly more water---a very small drop. 
Even to a very thirsty man, the benefit from each ellra drop would 
be either trivial, or imperceptible. If we ignore such effects, we 
must conclude that each of us has no reason to pour his pint into the 
cart. This is clearly wrong. 
My other case was the Harmless Torturers. Each of many 
torturers slightly increases a painful stimulus on each of many 
17 Irs not just our ordinary moral thinking which works badly 
when we confront very small or very large numbers. Our natural 
emotions, such as fear or sympathy, also go astray. (Here is one 
example. It seems emotionally impossible to give the right weight to 
very tiny risks, since we either fear these too much, like those who 
refuse to fly, or too little,like those wbo don 't wear seat-belts. The 
rigbt amount of fear is something we can·t feel. We have to use our 
reasoning to correct our emotions here. I shall be making a similar 
claim about very small effects on large numbers.) 
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victims. These torturers inflict great suffering on their victims. But 
because each effect is so dispersed, no torturer makes any victim 's 
pain perceptibly worse. If we ignore imperceptible effects, we must 
conclude that no torturer acts wrongly. This is absurd. 
I was discussing objective wrongness, insofar as this depends 
on consequences. If we are also discussing blame, as I am here, the 
case should not involve torturers, since there are other reasons why 
these should be blamed. We could substitute the Harmless 
PoUulers. Suppose that, in a city like Los Angeles, each of many 
people fails to repair the purifier on his elhaust. As a result, many 
people suffer. But, because the effects are so dispersed, no polluter 
makes a perceptible difference. 
How do these cases differ from those discussed above? In all 
of my eIamples, if enough of us had acted differently, we together 
could have made the outcome better. For each person, there are 
three possibilities. If he alone had acted differently, this would 
have either (J) also made the outcome better, or (2) left it the same, 
or (3) made it worse. (3) is true in coordination problems, such as 
Regan's Case. (2) is true in cases of overdetermination. In the cases 
now to be considered, (I) is true. 
More eIactly, I believe that in these cases (I) is true. I 
believe that, if each had acted differently, he would have made the 
outcome better. But others disagree. Since they ignore trivial or 
imperceptible effects, they believe that no one person could have 
made the outcome better. On their view, (2) is again true; these are 
further cases of overdetermination. 
Though this distinction is important, it can be hard to draw. 
But it often correspond to a physical distinction, which may be clear. 
Consider this variant of the Drops of Water. When I arrive, the cart 
is already full. If I add my pint, I will cause one pint to overflow. 
In this version of the case, my act will indeed make no difference to 
the wounded men: each will receive just as much water. Since (2) 
is true, I have no reaSOQ to add my pint, But in the other version of 
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the case, where the cart is never full, there is no overdetermination. 
Each eltra pint will make some difference: it will give each man an 
eItra drop. Since (I) is true, I ought to contribute. 
It may help to add these remarks. The effect of any single act 
may depend on the number of other acts. At one eIlreme. this 
dependence may be all or nothing. There may be some threshold, 
or number of people acting, such that above (or below) this number, 
any eItr. single act will have 00 effect. The classic case is voting. 
When this is true, there is overdetermination. It is true, in my 
elample, once the watercart is full. At the other eltreme, there is 
no dependence. Each act will have the same effect, however many 
other people act. This is true, in my elample, before the watercart 
is full. When this is true, the total effect of all the acts is purely 
additive. The marginal effect of each act is the same as the average 
effect. The truth may lie between these two eltremes. Each act 
may have some effect, however many other people act; but the size 
of each effect may depend on the number of other acts. The 
marginal effect may here diverge from the average effect. Thus, as 
the numbers grow, the marginal effect of each eIlra act may slowly 
decline. The same elample may have all three features. Below 
some rough threshold, any eIlra act may have the same effect; 
these effects may then diminish; and above some higher threshold 
there may be no effects. 
In my elamples, the facts are simple. Any eltra act would 
always have the same effect. Since the cart is never full, any eltra 
pint would give one eltra drop to each wounded man. And each 
drop would give each man the same benefit: it would do as much to 
reduce the pain of his thirst. Similarly, each Harmless Torturer 
does as much to increase the pain of each victim. 
Because these effects are so small, I assumed that they are 
imperceptible. We may object that, in the case of pain and pleasure, 
an imperceptible benefit is no benefit at all. This objection would 
not arise if we considered cases where the harms or benefits were 
merely trivial. (Thus, in my Fisherman·s Dilemma, each imposes on 
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each of the others a trivial financial loss. In the Commuters 
Dilemma, each imposes a trivial waste of time.) What I claim below 
could be applied. less controversially, to these other cases. 
I turn now to the moral question. Why should each of us pour 
his pint into the cart? And why are the Harmless Torturers, or 
Polluters, acting wrongly? 
I discussed two elplanations. One involves the assumption 
that pain can become really though imperoeptibly worse. On this 
assumption, each torturer inflicts some eltra pain on each victim. 
Though each effect has little moral importanoe, these effects add up. 
Each act is wrong because it imposes on the victims a significant 
total sum of suffering. 
The other elplanation appeals to what the Torturers together 
do. On this view, each acts wrongly because, though his own act 
makes no difference, he is a member of a group who together inflict 
great suffering on the victims. 
Of these uplanations. I prefer the appeal to single acts. It 
seems to me theoretically better. But in my book I gave three 
grounds for doubting this. 
First, there seemed to be other cases in which we cannot 
appeal to the effects of single acts. but must appeal to what we 
together do. These were cases of overdetermination. and 
coordination problems. I have now changed my view. As I have 
argued here, we C3J1 appeal in such cases to the effects of single 
acts. We need not appeal to what we together do. This strengthens 
the case for claiming that we never need this explanation. 
Second, as I have said. we may doubt that pain can become 
imperceptibly worse. Though I believe that this is true, in the 
morally relevant senses of the words 'pain' and 'worse ', I shall not 
pursue this further here. (It involves the special problems of the 
Sorites ParadoI.) 
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A third objection appealed to my elample of the Single 
Torturer. To exclude professional guilt, let this case involve some 
torturer's innocent nephew, up from the country and offered a 
whirl on the machine. The uncle explains that, for the torturers, 
this is a holiday. But, if the nephew presses the button, this will 
have the same effect as on an ordinary day. Each victim 's painful 
stimulus will be imperceptibly increased. Given these effects, 
would it be wrong to press the button? 
Many people answer No. If we give this answer, we must 
apply it to the torturers on ordinary days. The effects of each act 
cannot make it wrong, since these effects are just the same. Our 
explanation must appeal to what the torturers together do. 
I believe that the Torturer 's Nephew would be acting wrongly. 
Here is another ground for thinking this. 18 Can it make a moral 
difference whether we act with other agents, or with Nature? 
Suppose the nephew knows that the machines are already half 
primed, as on an ordinary day when half the torturers have pressed 
their buttons. His uncle says, 'Don't worry. No one else is here 
today. The machines are half-primed because of a flash of lightning 
caused a short-circuit.' Can this make a difference? If this claim is 
true, the nephew is acting alone. If the claim is false, he is acting 
with other agents. But in either case, the effect on the victims is the 
same. So, I believe, is the moral objection to what he is doing. 
We can ask a similar question about the water and the 
wounded men. Suppose that, when I arrive, there is already water 
in the carl. This may be rainwater, from some gutter overhead; or 
it may have been poured in by other people. How can it make a 
moral difference which of these is true? How can it affect whether 
I should add my pint? 
18 partly due to Peter Unger and Jerry Cohen. 
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[A SEcrION IS MISSING HERE. ITS ROUGH CONTENT WILL BE THIS: 
In all these cases we can appeal to the effects of single acts. 
This, moreover, is the better eIplanation. It is theoretically simpler. 
And, to be plausible, the appeal to sets of acts need. to be filled out 
in ways which make it parasitic on the appeal to single acts. 
One problem i. to define the group who, by acting together, 
have certain good or bad effects. In many cases, this cannot be 
done by appealing merely to the way in which each person acts. 
Some of these acts may have no effects. We must count, as 
members of the group, only those whose acts will have certain real 
but imperceptible effects. This returns us to the other eIplanation. 
Antober problem is to assess the strength of our reasons for or 
against acting in such groups. We might claim that each produces 
his share of the total harm or benefit. But this is acceptable only 
when the average effects are the same as the marginal effects. 
When these diverge, we should appeal to the marginal effects. This 
again returns us to the appeal to single acts.! 
[THE TEXT RESUMES! 
...... Of the two eIplanations, it is better to appeal to the effects 
of single acts. This suggests that we should never appeal to what 
groups together do. But this conclusion may be too swift. Even if 
we do not in theory need this appeal, it may have practical merits. 
It may provide what Broad called a Morlii Mia-oscope. 
Reconsider the Harmless Polluters. Suppose that I fail to 
repair my eIhaust in a city like Los Angeles. On my preferred 
eIplanation, my act is wrong because it imposes significant total 
harm on my fellow citizens. But since the effect on each will be 
either triviai.or imperceptible, it may be hard to think of my act as 
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seriously wrong. When I consider what I am doing to each victim, 
my natural sympathy may not be aroused. 
It may help to remind myself that I am a member of a group 
who tosether do great harm. We are lowering the quality of life of 
our fellow-citizens. We may even be responsible for killing certain 
people, those whose lungs cannot stand so much pollution. Thinking 
in this way may be psycholosicaJJy more effective. 
V THE EQUIVALENCE OF GLOVER PAIRS 
There is a better remedy. This involves a further use of some of my 
examples. I shaJJ call them Glover Pairs. 19 
The main idea is shown below: 
.,J.. 
:£tlJ)~ 
One to One Many to Many 
Whether the effects are one to one, or many to many, they are in 
total just the same. 
19 They derive from the Bilked iJe;ws Paudoz,. in Jonathan 




In the case of the Drops of Water, if each of us pours his pint 
into the cart, the effects will be many to many. Suppose instead that 
each of us carried his pint into the desert, and then gave it to some 
wounded man. The effects would then be one to one. In the case of 
the Harmless Torturers, we can suppose the following. In the Bad 
Old iRlys, each torturer turned some switch many times. Though 
each turning was imperceptible, their combined effect was to inflict 
severe pain on one victim. Things have now changed. Each of the 
torturers presses a button, thereby turning the switch once on each of 
the many instruments. Though the victims suffer as much, no 
torturer makes their pain perceptibly worse. 
Is there a moral difference between these Glover Pairs? I 
believe not. I believe that, if the total effects would be the same, it 
makes no difference whether the causal routes are one-one or 
many- many. Each of us has a reason to carry out his pint and give 
it to some wounded man; but it would be just as good to pour this 
pint into the cart. And the Harmless Torturers are acting just as 
wrongly as in the Bad Old Days. These claims elpress what I shall 
call the £qllivllfence 0/ Glover Pm$.. 20 
20 This view may seem to conflict with an assumption that is 
widely made, about the incommensurability of certain kinds of 
effect. Suppose that I can relieve either the great suffering of one 
person, or the discomfort of very many others. It is often claimed 
that helping the one should have priority. It is therefore claimed 
that no number of minor benefits to each of many people could 
together outweigh great burdens on a few. 
This is a common objection to Consequentialist reasoning. But 
it should often be restated as a claim about the goodness of 
outcomes. This may partly depend on the pattern of distribution. 
Thus an outcome may be better, though it has a greater sum of 
burdens, if these burdens are more fairly shared between different 
people. This difference need not be present in Glover Pairs. We 
can assu me that, in both cases, there is the same resulting 
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This is a view about wbat we are doing. On this view, we bave 
equal reasons for or against tbese acts, wbetber tbeir effects are 
one-one or many-many. Wben we turn to discuss blame, otber 
questions enter in. Tbus, if tbe effects are one-one, tbe agent's 
motives may be worse. It may take more brutality to inflict 
concentrated barm. Compare tbe bomber wbo knowingly kills 
innocent civilians from above tbe clouds, and tbe soldier wbo kills 
tbem witb his bayonet. Tbougb wbat be does is no worse, tbe 
soldier sbows a worse cbaracter, and may deserve more blame. For 
tbe same reason, tbe Harmless Torturers may deserve less blame 
tban tbey did in tbe Bad Old Days. It migbt be true, of new recruits, 
tbat tbey would bave refused orders under tbe old regime. 
Wben we blame people. it may also make a difference 
wbetber tbey act as members of a group. And tbe degree of blame 
sbould not simply correspond to tbe barm tbat eacb predictably 
does, wbetber this is judged as tbe average or tbe marginal effect. 
We sbould not assume tbat tbere is some filed quantity of blame, to 
be shared out. My two murderers don't deserve only half tbe 
blame tbat any single murderer would. 
As these remarks suggest, the Equivalence of Glover Pairs is 
not tbe natural view. We are inclined to give more weigbt to effects 
that are one-one. Compare OIfam and Adopt-a-Child. Oxfam is 
more efficient. In schemes like Adopt-a-Cbild, much money is 
wasted on eItra administrative costs. But, if I give to Oxfam, the 
effects may be spread out over many people, each of whom may 
benefit very little. If I give to Adopt-a-Child, I sball make a 
significant difference to at least one person. If we are not rational 





aJruists, we may prefer to have such effects. We shall then do less 
good. 
A similar point applies to harm. When our acts do harm, we 
may prefer that the bad effects be dispersed over many people. 
But the total effects may then be greater. If the distribution is no 
better, we shall thereby ma.l.:e the outcome worse. 
We need to refine our sympathy, and correct our inability to 
give due weight to tiny fractions and large numbers. Here is 
another suggestion. When our acts have small effects on each many 
people, we should imagine the corresponding member of a Glover 
Pair. We should imagine a case in which the effects of each act 
would be concentrated on one single person. We might find it hard 
to impose, on one person. the same total amount of pollution, or loss 
of time or livelihood. But what we are doing in the actual case is 
just as bad. It is no defence that none of us makes anyone 
perceptibly worse off. Nor do the Harmless Torturers. 
I shall end with another eIample. Suppose that I am ship-
wrecked on a desert island. The only other survivor is some 
stranger's child. I would be vividly aware of my moral reason to 
help this child. His fate depends entirely on me. Compare this with 
my situation when I consider giving to a scheme like Adopt-a-Child. 
In that case, there is not one but many children who need my help, 
and each of these children could be helped by many other people. 
This suggests another kind of Glover Pair. The arrows on the 
diagram can show not actual but possible effects. If each of us was 
ship-wrecked with a single child, the possibility of help would take 
a one-one form. If any child suffered, because he was not helped, 
one of us would be wholly responsible. In a case like Adopt-a-
Child, the actual help would still be one-one. But, if we do not help, 
our negative responsibility is dispersed. Since each of us could help 
any child , none is uniquely responsible for the fate any one child. 
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This dispersal of responsibility makes a are at difference to our 
natural emotions. But it makes no moral difference. Nor, as we 
bave seen, does tbe dispersal of effects. OIfam is also morally 
equivalent. We bave as mucb reason to belp as if we were sbip-
wrecked witb a sinale cbild. 
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